

SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Comments on the Draft of Mr. Dulles' Speech - 19 September - San Francisco

General

In our opinion the general tone and tenor of the speech is overly hopeful and optimistic. It is true that reservations and warnings are stated at the end of the speech, but the thrust of the speech is still such as to encourage the belief that International Communism is in the process of inevitable disintegration. This is, of course, a matter of judgment - indeed of intuition - but in our opinion little purpose is served by encouraging the naturally sanguine and perhaps complacent tendencies of the American public. We feel that the emphasis of public utterances should always be on the extreme gravity of the Communist threat. If it turns out that we have been Cassandra beyond necessity, so much the better.

Specific Comments and Suggestions

Para. 3. Some transition may be required from Para. 2. Suggestion: "Our society is confronted with a world situation in which the two great forces of stability and change are in an almost unique state of tension. Our American way of life, which was launched on a wave of revolution, and shaken by a great civil conflict, has achieved what we feel to be a high degree of stability. And yet it is confronted internally with factors of change

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and development whose outcome we cannot always foresee, and externally with menacing revolutionary challenges of world-conquering thrust." If this transition were adopted, the first two lines of Para. 4 would have to be modified: "In a scene characterized by the interplay of change and efforts to maintain stability, it is difficult . . . " etc.

Page 4 - first and second paragraphs. Should not a sharper distinction be drawn between the loyalty problem in the USSR and those in China and the East European satellites? We feel that one should not discount the satisfaction and pride which the Russian and perhaps the bulk of the Soviet peoples derive from the impressive growth in power, wealth and influence of the Soviet Union. This is also true of Communist China.

Page 4 - last paragraph. It is a basic Communist principle that change is an essential aspect of progress. This is expressed in the so-called "dialectical" view of history: thesis-antithesis-synthesis. The task for the Communist Party and its leaders is to bring about change in a way to strengthen the system, rather than weaken its vital principles. Hence the current emphasis on the d"creative interpretation" of Marxism-Leninism, expressed in the simultaneous attack on "dogmatism" and "revisionism". Of the two, the latter is currently regarded as the greater danger and is the more severely reprovod. We are not convinced that the Communists regard the Marxist-Leninist theories as of "little aid" today; but they are showing greater flexibility in applying them. We must follow their distinctions between goals and methods, strategy and tactics, in evaluating their situation.

Paragraph 6. There is considerable confusion in Western thinking about the "revolutionary" nature of Communism. In the Soviet view, the USSR established the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by revolutionary means. On that base it has "built socialism" - not merely laid its foundations, as Molotov alleged. It is now proceeding to the achievement of "Communism". No other country has fully completed the "construction of socialism" phase, hence they must all, in some measure, follow the Russian model. This applies to China. The loss of revolutionary fervor and drive is not necessarily uniform throughout the Communist world. It may actually be a source of strength within the USSR, "base" of world Communism, while providing an "exportable" commodity which is not only attractive in the areas of "liberation" throughout the former "colonial" and the underdeveloped areas but is a useful tool of Soviet policy.

Paragraph 7. It is true that there are no new "prophets" in the USSR, but as indicated above, they may not be necessary at this stage of Soviet development. They are still required in China, and Mao fulfills that role.

Paragraph 8. Middle. Suggest delete "reckless" and substitute "systematic" cruelties of secret police.

Paragraph 10. Question first sentence. Beria attempted to use his control of the secret police, which had become a state within a state, as the primary means of seizing power. It was not his only means, as is

shown by his role in respect of the "nationalities" policy and (probably) East Germany. But he lacked the essential means, control of a powerful party following; hence he failed.

Paragraph 11. There is no antithesis between "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "collective leadership". The primary distinction is between a "collegial" and a "one-man rule", both exercised in the name of the "proletariat".

Page 8, second paragraph. It is probably true that "purges" have in general strengthened the Communist party, even though they may be unsettling at the time. We would suggest that the "separation of powers" principle as developed in the US is not applicable to Russian political experience.

Paragraph 12. Malenkov was obliged to confess primarily to "inexperience" and to certain economic shortcomings. However, the New Course principles were largely maintained by the successor regime. The controversy over the priority of "heavy industry" was largely a manifestation of the deadly power struggle. All Soviet leaders, whatever their factional position, have consistently maintained that this priority was absolute, but that increasing investment in consumer goods was necessary and possible.

Page 9, line 5. Perhaps better to say with the "acquiescence" rather than the "support" of the military. The role of the military, except in matters of defense, still appears to us to be subordinate to that of the party.

Paragraph 13. There are strong indications that Khrushchev is consciously following the pattern of Stalin's seizure of power. How far he will pursue that course remains to be seen. It is doubtful that he will attempt to push beyond the stage Stalin reached in the early 30s. before the blood purges. - Suggest change last line to "darkness of Outer Mongolia".

Paragraph 14. It might be worthwhile to amplify the "handpicked" aspect, pointing out that between a third and a half of the Central Committee was personally appointed by Khrushchev or the Secretariat which he fully controlled. As a result of the coup by which he seized power, it may be possible in the future for the Presidium to ignore the Central Committee, as in the past. (Suggest Presidium be substituted for Politburo, throughout).

In general, this section of the discussion appears to give too little weight to the decisive role of the CPSU apparatus. Khrushchev has adopted the role of restorer of the party, and it would seem prudent to assume that he will have considerable success in it.

Page 11, top line. The Soviet leaders probably still regard Lenin - and even Stalin - as useful guides in the field of power politics and foreign policy.

Page 12. It might be worthwhile to point out that there has been an extended discussion in Soviet economic circles of the role of price, costs and market in a planned economy. Probably at this stage no one can foresee what changes will take place in the centralized planning function, but

(top of Page 12) it might be noted: (a) that the economic ministries of the Union Republics are represented at the Moscow level; (b) Gosplan has been greatly strengthened. (Some 27 specialized ministries have been abolished).

Page 13 - First paragraph. It may be questioned whether the military would exercise a decisive voice in "decentralization". Of course, if the reorganization results ^{ed} in a weakening of defense production, they might have something to say. But it might be noted that the 7 or 8 ministries most involved in defense production were not ^{cluded} involved in the decentralization.

Page 13, last paragraph. As an indication of the magnitude of the "virgin lands" program, it might be pointed out that ⁹⁰ 200 million acres have already been opened, with a promise of considerably more. This increment is larger than the entire wheat growing area of Canada ~~for~~ the United States, ~~I believe~~, though of course of inferior quality. The climatological significance of the gamble might be pointed up by the fact that 3 out of 5 years should normally have crop failures. The sequence of an excellent and a fair year has already cheated the law of averages over the past 40 years. Nevertheless, it is too early to predict that the gamble will fail in its objective, which is to provide the necessary increment, at whatever cost, to bring the Soviet food supply more nearly up to the expectations and desires of the people.

Page 13 - last line. Suggest "problem" rather than "fiasco", ~~/~~ which appears too strong.

Page 14-15. It will be interesting to see what progress the Soviets make in improving farm labor efficiency. Now that the r industrial manpower situation has entered the intensive phase (sharpened by the loss of 40 million persons in World War II, creating a birthrate decline which is now beginning to be felt in the labor supply) they will undoubtedly be forced to intensify the mechanization and rationalization of agriculture. The potential here is enormous, provided the incentive problems of the collective farms can be solved. There are signs that Khrushchev recognizes this, and will take the necessary steps (cf. the abolition of forced deliveries from the peasants' private plots).

Page 16 top. You might add the claim of the Soviet breeders that they will be able to produce a larger number of twin lambs!

Page 17. We feel that the Soviet policy toward the satellites is fairly clear now - maintenance of firm control, with greater elasticity and avoidance of coercion; opposition to "national Communism", ambivalent relations with Tito, watchful attitude toward Gomulka, etc. We believe that the USSR has not abandoned the long-range goal of integrating the economies, at least, and eventually the politics of the satellites with the USSR. Hungary, of course, remains a standing difficulty, and at the moment, it is particularly acute. We believe, however, that the Soviet leaders have confidence that time will reduce the gravity of this setback, particularly in the area of their primary diplomatic thrust, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Page 18 - line 4. Query "facts of life" - has other connotations.

Line 8 - suggest change "panicky" to "alarmed".

Paragraph 18 - Suggest less colloquial phrases such as "answer obliquely, and turn aside with vituperation and diversive issues".

The great interest of the Dudintsev novel lay in the picture it painted of creative individual genius frustrated by "careerism". Perhaps the chief reason Khrushchev has "lambasted" it is the fact that Dudintsev assigns no role to the party whatsoever in the resolution of the dramatic conflict. Khrushchev did admit that the book had some merits, and indeed, the Soviet press is full of attacks on bureaucratic stultification, always emphasizing that these are distortions of the system, not basic faults in it.

Page 19 - last paragraph. Suggest omit "dream world" and substitute "have little or no knowledge . . ." Suggest "allegedly hostile attitudes of certain American circles" - (usually identified as Wall Street, Admiral Radford and the Dulles brothers!). They emphasize the potential friendliness of the "American people".

Paragraphs 19-20. While we agree that the long-range prospects of the Soviet educational system may be favorable to us, we would suggest that: (a) political indoctrination will undoubtedly be increased with perhaps growing effectiveness; (b) there is as yet no evidence that Soviet students and intellectuals are extensively criticizing the fundamentals of the Communist system; and (c) disciplinary measures and career incentives, coupled with

further extension of economic opportunity and foreign policy successes, may go far to minimize student restiveness.

Paragraph 20, last sentence. The problem of the "technocracy" needs intensive study. We feel that the antithesis between party apparatchiks and industrial managers has been exaggerated. To a considerable extent they represent complementary and interlocking careers and interests.

Paragraph 21. The discussion of Soviet motives in disarmament seem to be somewhat incomplete. There are undoubtedly economic considerations, and propaganda advantages. Basically, they may not be averse to the continuation of the arms race, at least for a while longer. It is a subtle, dangerous game, but not necessarily one which divides the party from the military leaders.

Paragraph 23. The Communists of course claim that their system is responsive to the true needs and aspirations of the people. The area of ambiguity is well indicated in Sukarno's "guided democracy" concept, which may have been foisted on him by the Communists.

Paragraph 24. Some repetition in 1st sentence.

Paragraph 25. Last paragraph. We suggest that the ideological force of Communism in established Communist regimes may still be considerable; from being the basis of a militant revolutionary movement, it gradually becomes an accepted set of principles, neither subject to controversy nor special enthusiasm.

The discussion of the appeal of Communism in the underdeveloped areas might be expanded slightly to include more reference to the convergence of socialism and nationalism.

Pages 25-26. We are inclined to question the applicability of the analogy of the French Revolution to the Bolshevik, except in the most cautious and generalized terms. A "Bonapartist" evolution seems doubtful in the atomic age.

Page 27. The Chinese parallel needs further development, emphasizing: the four class approach, including the national bourgeoisie, the great speedup of socialization in 1955, the different balance of agriculture and industry, as compared with the USSR, etc. (We would be glad to attempt a paragraph along these lines).

Suggest the theme of "entrapment" be mentioned in connection with the current attack on "rightist deviationists" - (cf. Secretary Dulles' recent press conference).

Page 27 - last paragraph. We question the "coming demise".

Page 30 - middle. We believe that the Soviet people are questioning the methods more than the basic tenets of the Communist system.

16 September 1957